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BANKING IN THE BUSH: WAITING FOR CREDIT
IN SOUTH AFRICA’S RURAL ECONOMY
Elizabeth Hull
The South African countryside has, for many years, been the object of
‘developmental’ intervention by the government, parastatals and, to a lesser
extent, private industry. A signiﬁcant part of this has involved attempts to bolster
local economies with large injections of cash in the form of loans provided to
small-scale farmers and other rural businesses (Witt et al. 2006; James 2007).
These have come mainly from state-supported institutions such as the Land Bank,
given the lack of willingness on the part of the commercial banking sector to lend,
until recently, to ‘high-risk’ groups (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 78–81). The
failure of such efforts, due largely to poor levels of debt repayment,1 signals an
array of underlying institutional, economic and infrastructural deﬁciencies, often
rooted in deeper histories of rural degradation and turmoil resulting from
successive colonial and apartheid policies (Bryceson 2004). The shift over the
last few years to microﬁnance represents the most recent effort to provide credit
to the informal self-employed, and is part of a process of banking reform in
which the so-called ‘second economy’ is targeted comprehensively with the aim
of bringing it under the regulatory mechanisms of the formal sector. Pedagogy
and ﬁnancial self-discipline play an important part in this, with eligibility
for loans being dependent on savings. It remains to be seen, however, to what
extent the optimism of this recent shift to microﬁnance is deserved, especially
in a context characterized by entrenched histories of loan defaulting and
saturated local economies with poor access to markets (see Servet 2010;
Bateman 2010). As Parker Shipton reminds us, while credit ‘promotes itself
easily’, it also implies indebtedness, and all the complicated repercussions this
may bring (2010: 4–6).
Current microﬁnance institutions are distinguished from previous loan
programmes because they represent the post-apartheid government’s emphasis
on decentralization and citizen participation in development. The costly tasks of
bureaucratic administration and management are devolved to locally founded
organizations, and buttressed by an ideology of self-help, individual social
responsibility and entrepreneurialism. The real participatory potential of local
development initiatives, however, often remains limited in practice (Marais
2011: 352–6; Sithole et al. 2007). Development generally takes place within
circumscribed parameters with little genuine input from its recipients who, on
the contrary, tend to ﬁnd themselves in perpetual limbo, waiting for well-
intentioned initiatives to begin functioning. In the space of this disconnect
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between planners and beneﬁciaries, and in the temporal suspension caused by
delay, unexpected or unintended processes emerge during which beneﬁts may
accrue. As Deborah James writes, for instance, in relation to processes of land
reform, ‘It is when the fulﬁlment of promises is indeﬁnitely delayed that people
may, instead, choose the option of full-blown political patronage’ (James 2007:
223).
In this article, I describe how residents of an agricultural region in the province
of KwaZulu-Natal both wait and search for credit, and the types of activities
which emerge in the interim. Encounters with government and other institutions,
as anthropologists have frequently shown, are not smooth and constant, but
intermittent and partial, planned or unplanned, punctuated by particular events,
and intermingled with a range of strategies also involving kin, friends and other
local people (see, for example, Shipton 2010; James 2007; Gupta 1995). I give an
example of how this takes place in Makhathini, KwaZulu-Natal, through the
story of one aspiring farmer. His account offers an interesting vantage point from
which to view the setting up of a microﬁnance bank, a recent initiative of which he
is a member.2 A government stipulation was that the bank demonstrate its
effective operation through regular inﬂows and outﬂows of cash, prior to paying
out any loans. Accordingly, members were encouraged to invest money in order
to qualify for a loan at a later stage. The research was based on the initial stages of
formation of the microﬁnance institution, when members were saving in the bank
but before any loans were distributed. Thus, the purpose of the article is not to
analyse the institution per se, nor to assess its success or failure, but rather to
describe how new expectations for credit featured within a range of diverse
ﬁnancial strategies. It gives an account of the factors that enhanced or inhibited
the willingness of members to invest in the bank, and the processes that occurred
while members were ‘waiting for credit’.
LOCATING MAKHATHINI
Makhathini is an area of around 13,000 hectares spread over the low-lying areas
east of the southern Lebombo mountain range in northern KwaZulu-Natal. It is
the site of a major development, the Makhathini Irrigation Scheme, which
occupies an area of 3,864 hectares, most of which is divided into ten-hectare plots
rented and managed by 314 individual farmers. Many of these engage in small-
scale commercial farming. The remaining land within the scheme is divided into
243 smaller ‘gardens’ of 0.2 hectares each. Beyond the scheme live ‘dry-land
farmers’ and other residents, who rely on small and intermittent rainfall and
various other limited sources of income. Mixed cropping is the norm, with maize,
sugarcane, beans and a variety of vegetables grown widely. Following the closure
of the local cotton ginnery in 2008, cotton is barely grown in the area, although it
had been the main cash crop for years.
As is widely recognized in the literature on small-scale farming in South Africa,
the majority of individuals that describe themselves as farmers do not, in fact, rely
2The name of the microﬁnance bank is not disclosed in this article. All names of individuals are
pseudonyms.
169RURAL BANKING AND CREDIT
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 20 Mar 2013 IP address: 212.219.238.14
exclusively on farming.3 On the contrary, despite the visual landscape which
suggests a local economy driven by agriculture, subsistence for the majority of its
residents rests predominantly upon the receipt of government grants, including
pensions, child grants and disability grants. In addition, petty trade and piecemeal
jobs of various sorts, and remittances from family members working in the city,
all contribute to incomes. A small proportion of Makhathini’s residents work in
the formal sector, usually in public sector jobs as nurses, teachers, police or
municipal government administrators. According to the deprivation index of the
Health District Barometer of 2008/9, based on a range of demographic and socio-
economic data, the district of Umkhanyakude – under which Makhathini falls – is
the second most ‘deprived’ of 52 provinces nationally (Day et al. 2009: 197).
Government intervention in agriculture in the region, beginning under
colonialism, intensiﬁed following the construction of the large Jozini Dam in
the 1960s, which today supplies the Makhathini Irrigation Scheme. It was
originally built to support the relocation of poor white South Africans who were
to build farms there, but this relocation never materialized, amid increasing urban
employment opportunities during the economic boom of that decade. Over the
course of several years, the dam became the focus of new plans to support and
develop the surrounding black population (Witt et al. 2006). Thus the abortion of
initial plans to improve the lot of poor whites gave rise to a political opportunity
of a different sort for the apartheid government as it sought to gain legitimacy for
the ‘homelands’ by measures that included facilitating development in these
regions.4 Yet this process, as with other homeland policies, was deeply
contradictory and divisive. Following the opening of the dam in 1974, 5,000
people were removed and resettled in order to establish the Makhathini Irrigation
Scheme, initiating a turbulent and ongoing relationship of distrust between
farmers and government that was reinforced by a series of incoherent and
inconsistent institutional and political frameworks through which development
was attempted (ibid.: 500).
Despite the government’s efforts, particularly via the irrigation scheme, to
create a cadre of middle-class farming entrepreneurs, farmers proved persistently
dependent on external credit (cf. Francis 2000). Loans provided to farmers by the
KwaZulu homeland government were not repaid, leading to an entrenched
culture of loan defaulting by the end of the decade. During the 1990s, a new loan
scheme was set up by the Land Bank, a government-supported development
bank. But this came to an end in 2004, by which time the sum of defaulted loans
had reached R22.7 million (about £2 million). Makhathini received international
attention, emerging at the centre of a controversial and polarized debate over
the impact of the genetically modiﬁed Bt Cotton, introduced in the area in 1998.
While some initial research proclaimed the crop a success (Thirtle et al. 2003),
others declared its uptake a sign of necessity rather than choice, given the
3Smallholder farmers in South Africa are rarely able to earn their income from farming alone
(James 2007).
4The ‘homelands’, or bantustans, were territories set aside by the apartheid government for the
purpose of creating ethnically homogeneous, independent states for South Africa’s black ethnic
groups. Ten were created altogether, including KwaZulu (‘place of the Zulus’), within which the
area of this study formerly was situated. With the inception of liberal democracy in 1994, the
bantustans were dismantled and new borders were created for nine national provinces.
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circular dependency upon cotton seed and credit that by now had emerged
(Pschorn-Strauss 2005; Mayet 2007; Witt et al. 2006). Its introduction was
described as
the latest in a long series of technocratic interventions that have consistently failed to
transform Makhathini into a hotbed of commodity production, but have instead been
guided by a technocratic will to make cotton a lucrative cash crop, regardless of local
conditions, needs or ecology. (Witt et al. 2006: 501)
During the period of research in 2010, the area was steeped in political dispute
and uncertainty, with a messy and incomplete transfer of land from government
to chieﬂy control as part of the national land reform process; this generated
seemingly irresolvable disputes between the two chiefs operating in the area, and
considerable uncertainty among farmers about the status of their land-leasing
arrangements. In addition, several promised government interventions were
still awaiting evidence of implementation including, among others, a new cotton
mill, a marketplace where farmers could sell their products to long-distance
traders with the guarantee of price control, and a microﬁnance bank which had
been set up and was accepting investments but had not yet begun administering
loans.
In the meantime, immediate cash ﬂows circulated through a multitude of
locally based informal ﬁnancial organizations, including stokvels, savings clubs
and a variety of other rotating credit societies. Many of these were based on the
idea of saving and credit cycles, though these were generally oriented toward
consumptive practices such as funerary or wedding expenses, or lending for the
purposes of generating interest, rather than for productive enterprise (cf. Bähre
2007; Shipton 2010). This accords with Porteous and Hazelhurst’s observation
that microcredit loans given to salaried workers during the 1990s were used
primarily for consumption purposes rather than to fund micro-enterprise, in
contrast to well-known international models of microﬁnance such as Grameen. In
the Eastern Cape, Bank and Qambata (1999) show that the pensions increase did
not lead to investments in agricultural activities and other productive investments,
as the government had hoped, but rather was spent on immediate family welfare.
Despite this evidence, the microﬁnance movement expects that credit will be used
productively rather than for consumption. The following story describes one
person’s search for credit, an ongoing process in which the microﬁnance bank
mentioned above featured as one of several institutional encounters.
SNUK’S WORK: MORAL AND SOCIAL HIERARCHIES OF
MONEY MAKING
I ﬁrst found out about the microﬁnance bank through Sipho, a resident of the
village where I was staying, some forty minutes’ drive from Makhathini. I met
him in January 2010 at the market held once a month on pension day. I explained
that I was doing research about local ﬁnancial practices: different ways that
people generated, saved, exchanged and invested money. He told me that he was a
member of a local ﬁnancial organization, ‘a bank run by the people’, which was
about to be registered as ‘an ofﬁcial bank’. I asked him what he meant and he told
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me excitedly, ‘It will be a bank, a formal bank like ABSA and all those others.5 It
will be exactly the same.’
Sipho was not clear on the details, such as who was providing the bank’s
accreditation or from where the money would come that would be issued as loans.
That it was not, in fact, registered with the Reserve Bank and did not fall under
the same regulatory mechanisms as ABSA, was neither known by Sipho nor
relevant to him. For Sipho, what made the bank ‘formal’ – and thus akin to other
high street banks –was the services it would offer and, more especially, the
accreditation it was about to receive. What Anna Tsing (2000) has described as
the ‘economy of appearances’ is crucial here, whereby material certiﬁcates,
documents and the aesthetics of the bank itself are essential to its identity as a
formal institution, a point to which I return.
Sipho’s understanding of what counted as ‘formal’ was shaped by some existing
experience with the banking sector. He was a 26-year-old aspiring farmer who,
despite having no regular income and currently living off his mother’s pension,
was determined to establish a farming business. He was ambitious and hoped to
pursue various businesses after starting a farm.
Sipho completed his matriculation (university entrance certiﬁcate) in 2005
with excellent results and ﬂuency in English. He moved to the town of Port
Shepstone, south of Durban, where his sister’s partner secured him a job working
for a delivery company. He found the work boring, and came home after six
months when his brother informed him that a temporary teaching post in
English and History had become available at his former school. He applied and
got the position. He worked there for a year and a half until his contract expired
at the end of 2007. At this point he decided that the time had come to pursue
his childhood ambition of farming. He got a job in a nearby bottle store
while accumulating information about how to start a business, meeting with
various government advisers and visiting banks in search of a loan. During
the ﬁrst year he learned fast, soon discovering that it was more complex
than he had realized to secure credit. He playfully mocked his own earlier
naïvety:
At the start I didn’t know a single thing! I thought I would go to a bank myself and then
tell them with my own utterances. I said to myself, ‘I have to tell them conﬁdently, so that
maybe they will give me that capital that I want.’ I planned that I would say, ‘I’m having
this career that I am glowing about! So I am requesting R500,000 from you.’ I thought
that they would respond by saying, ‘Oh, are you sure about that career?’ I would respond
by saying, ‘More than sure!’ And I thought that that would be the only thing they would
be looking for from me. After that, I thought that they would ask for my account
number, then I will give it to them. Then I will get the money! I said to myself, ‘It will be
as easy as that,’ while I didn’t know!
It took several months before Sipho had a clear sense of what was required. In
2009, after contacting many companies and agencies in search of advice, and with
the help of a friend from his church congregation who owned a beer distribution
company, he eventually started to write a business plan. He was informed by a
5ABSA is a large commercial high-street bank with branches in both nearby towns.
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person at Ithala bank (a South African high-street bank) that in order to access a
loan, he must submit his completed business proposal and a copy of the lease for
the land he planned to use. In addition, a government adviser in nearby Jozini
suggested he form a cooperative, because ‘sole traders’ found it more difﬁcult
than cooperatives to access loans. He also needed to apply for a CK form which
would signify that the business was ofﬁcially recognized and incorporated.6
Forming the cooperative with three other people that he knew, he applied for the
CK, which he ﬁnally received on 26 March 2010, and with which he was able to
open a business account. He also started negotiating, but inconclusively, with
various farmers to hire a plot of land. On 8 May, he took his CK to the South
African Revenue Service to register for tax payments, a process required in order
to validate the CK form. He explained to me the importance of the form: ‘This
CK is everything. . . . It’s an ofﬁcial document for everyone to start a business
with. It means that the business is formal, not informal.’
Sipho also used this form in order to join the government database for tender
contracts. Such short-term contracts have become common in South Africa in
recent years and have received widespread media attention following several
notorious corruption cases. They are well-known and highly sought-after because
of their extremely lucrative revenues (see McNeill, this volume). Sipho joined the
tender database, preferring to keep open several income options rather than
investing all his energies into one. A further incentive was that farming required
signiﬁcant input capital, and that unexpected scenarios often arose in farming
that required ﬁnancial resources. Bidding for tenders was a short-term means
designed to serve a longer-term goal.
That Sipho’s day-to-day subsistence was assured by his mother’s pension made
possible such planning in the short and medium terms, a temporal dimension
which often inﬂuences the nature of informal economic activity in South Africa.
Nonetheless, to accomplish even such immediate objectives as entering the tender
database, capital was required. Without any source of income, current employ-
ment or savings, how, I asked Sipho, had he managed to pay for the CK form,
which cost him R750? He laughed, rather embarrassedly, somewhat reluctant to
tell me. Later in the conversation, he said ‘No, I can tell you. I was selling wood. I
used to collect the wood into big bundles and sell it for R150 each.’ It was hard
work, he explained, because he was doing it alone. He had to carry each of the
logs up the mountainside to his home from the wooded valley below. People
drove to his house to collect it, because the bundles were too large to be carried.
He earned a lot of money, he told me, because there was a very high demand for
the wood. ‘I sweated for this CK!’ he repeatedly told me. I asked him why he
didn’t want to tell me about it at ﬁrst. He laughed, saying ‘Ah, it’s snuk’s work’,
making a dismissive gesture with his hand: snuk is a colloquial term for ‘low’ or
‘stupid’. ‘The work is just basic,’ he added, searching for the right words, ‘just
labour.’
6The CK is an ofﬁcial document issued by the Companies and Intellectual Property
Registration Ofﬁce (CIPRO) of the Department of Trade and Industry, whose slogan – ‘gateway
to formal economic participation’ – exempliﬁes ‘formality’ as a popularised term. <http://www.
cipro.gov.za>, accessed 10 May 2010.
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Sipho’s story demonstrates that entering into a process of formalization did not
entail relinquishing his engagement in popular economies. Indeed, given the
expensive administrative and transport costs of acquiring the CK form, the
process of formalization actually generated the activities to which he referred
pejoratively as ‘snuk’s work’. The so-called ‘formal’ was here giving rise to
‘informal’ activities. To see them as detached economic spheres would be
misleading. Nonetheless, his own reference to ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ suggests
that he perceived them as separate and, more so, that they formed a hierarchical
relationship to one another such that the former was more desirable. His reference
to ‘snuk’s work’, as well as his general embarrassment that he made money from
collecting and selling wood, indicated that, despite their money-generating
potential, he viewed such pursuits as inferior since they lacked the status
associated with business ownership. His self-mockery about his earlier inexperi-
ence in loan seeking, accentuated by the physical ‘labour’ associated with
informality, implied that he felt he had now entered an esoteric realm, to negotiate
which a degree of sophistication and skill was required.
Sipho joined the microﬁnance bank during 2009, after hearing about it from his
cousin. He joined in order to receive a loan, but he knew that this was unlikely for
some time: it was just one of several options for him. In any case, he needed a
substantial loan, more than it was likely to provide. ‘All in all,’ he said, ‘I am not
expecting much from this bank. It is still early.’ For this reason, and because he
had no money to spare, he was not investing savings into the bank – a requirement
to gain a loan at a later stage. For Sipho, then, the microﬁnance bank was merely
one of a number of opportunities. As described by the literature on ‘multiple
livelihoods’ (Francis 2000; Murray 2000), it was central to his strategy that he
keep open a variety of possibilities: he was reluctant to commit to pursuing any
single activity.
By May 2010, Sipho had managed to get a tender contract to build an RDP
house.7 Rather than securing this job directly from government contractors, he
acquired a ‘sub-contract’ through an intermediary who had already won a
contract to build several houses in the area. They agreed verbally to the terms of
the job, and Sipho was told he would be remunerated when the job was
completed. Sipho employed two bricklayers, including his own cousin, to help
him with the job, with the promise of remunerating them at the end. The
contractor delivered materials to the site and they began work. About two weeks
later, they discovered that they had made an error with the building’s
measurements. They had to start it again. Sipho’s contractor told him that he
must pay for the costs of the error, including the building’s demolition. Sipho
asked him to deduct the amount from his ﬁnal salary, but the man refused.
Clearly distressed, Sipho told me that if he was unable to pay, he feared the
government would take him off the tender database. He quickly borrowed R1,900
(about £160) from a friend to cover the costs.
They began work once again, and were making good progress. But two weeks
later he encountered another problem. Having informed the contractor that he
had run out of materials, he awaited the delivery of more. They did not arrive and,
7From ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’: social housing provided by the
government.
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by the second day, he was becoming frustrated by the delay. After a week or so of
waiting, and being unable to contact his employer who failed to answer his calls,
Sipho began to realize that the contractor no longer wanted him to work on the
job. With growing frustration, he waited on the site for several more days.
Following further attempts to contact his employer and an angry letter to
government contractors, he ﬁnally gave up, realizing that he would be unable to
ﬁnish the job, pay his labourers or receive any remuneration. Encouraged by me
to seek assistance from the government, he insisted that they would not be
interested in what he had to say, nor did they have any responsibilities towards
him. He was only a sub-contractor. He preferred to put it behind him and search
for a new contract.
Sipho’s experience supports an increasingly common narrative about tenders
being controlled by corrupt middlemen. But Sipho was the victim not only of the
behaviour of an individual, but also of a system of deregulated labour and the
withdrawal of state responsibility for a sphere of temporary labourers whose work
is consequently insecure, despite needing formal accreditation in the form of a CK
document. This pattern is replicated throughout state services such as health, and
through microﬁnance schemes, in which the government increases regulation
through procedures such as audit, while withdrawing responsibility by replacing it
with intermediary companies, institutions and individuals (Hull, forthcoming).
Sipho’s impression of tender contracts as high-status, formal and highly lucrative
forms of income creation were belied by his experience of one of them. Though
he had adopted the perspective of a sharp distinction between ‘formal’ and
‘informal’ in the manner in which he spoke about his aspirations, his experiences
reﬂected a different reality, often made up of piecemeal and disconnected
encounters, only partially meeting his expectations of them. As Jane Guyer puts
it: ‘formality is experienced by the population in its plural and concrete
forms . . . rather than as an enduring generalizable principle’ (2004: 158). Despite
his initial enthusiasm about the microﬁnance bank’s ofﬁcial status, for instance,
the ongoing delay that Sipho observed, along with its failure to adopt the
aesthetic signiﬁers of ‘formality’, gradually challenged his trust in it.
COMMUNITY BANKING
The South African Microﬁnance Apex Fund (SAMAF) was founded in April
2002. A branch of the Department of Trade and Industry, SAMAF’s goal is to
‘facilitate the provision of affordable access to ﬁnance by micro, small and
survivalist business for the purpose of growing their own income and asset base’
via a ‘network of self-sufﬁcient and sustainable microﬁnance institutions’.8 Such
institutions, some of which are categorized as Financial Services Cooperatives
(FSCs), have exemption from the Banks Act, and are governed therefore under a
different set of regulations than are larger commercial banks, even though some
of the same services are provided. This exemption allows smaller, ‘community-
based’ organizations to provide ﬁnancial services without the need to conform to
8<www.samaf.org.za>, accessed 10 October 2010.
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the more complex system of regulations that governs large institutions. One such
FSC is that recently set up in Makhathini.
This community bank was founded by a small group of cotton farmers in 2007.
Formally a Financial Services Cooperative, it is referred to by its members as a
‘bank’. As of September 2010, the bank had approximately 1,200 members, most
of whom engaged in some kind of farming – from subsistence to small-scale
commercial production – alongside a range of other income-generating activities.
The chairperson explained the members’motivations for setting up the bank after
they had made contact with SAMAF:
We realized that when we went to institutions to borrow money, we had problems. They
used to ask for assets: ‘Do you have an asset? Do you own a house?’ So that before they
give you money you’ve got to qualify. So it was so hard for us. That is why we decided to
see if we can make ourselves a banking institution.
Beginning initially as a project to assist farmers, it later expanded to include
anyone in the Makhathini and Jozini area seeking a loan for the purpose of
funding microenterprise. SAMAF advised that they must raise an initial
R100,000 (nearly £10,000) in order to qualify for the status of an ‘intermediary
institution’ that would be eligible for funds. The group of farmers agreed to raise
the money by recruiting new members and charging a R100 joining fee. They
advertised the bank on a local radio station and quickly raised the necessary
funds, storing these in an account held at ABSA in the nearby town of Jozini.
It took over three years ﬁnally to reach the point of ofﬁcial accreditation. On
22 February 2010 the bank was registered with SAMAF as a Financial Services
Cooperative (FSC). On 4 May 2010, the certiﬁcate was formally handed to the
chairperson of the newly formed community bank during a general meeting to
celebrate the bank’s accreditation.
In a meeting held during the month prior to this, members were told that they
must start saving in order to qualify for loans at a later stage. This was a condition
laid down by SAMAF, as a way to ensure the bank’s full operation through
sufﬁcient inﬂow and outﬂow, and to encourage people to save, though it appeared
that this had not been explained to members when they joined. An arrangement
whereby an amount of R50 (about £4.50) was to be voluntarily invested each
month was voted in by members. Despite this lip service to participatory decision
making, the announcement created mixed feelings among members, many of
whom were already disheartened by an unexpectedly long waiting period since
they ﬁrst joined the bank. One member responded indignantly, accusing the
board of leading him to the false belief that his initial payment of R100 would
render him eligible for a loan. Standing up and pointing repeatedly at the
SAMAF representative, Mandla made it clear that members’ distrust of the bank
was exacerbated by the representative’s absence at previous meetings, which they
had expected him to attend. The coinciding of the SAMAF representative’s
belated arrival and the announcement of further conditions to be met by members
evidently compromisedMandla’s trust: both in the people deemed to have control
of the bank’s funds, and in the capability of the institution itself to fulﬁl the
responsibility he felt it ought to have towards him. The calm response of the man
from SAMAF diverted the moral onus away from himself and the bank, and
on to the members, in an attempt to redeﬁne the terms of their discussion.
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‘You expect a loan from the bank,’ he said, ‘but what do you think the bank
expects from you?’ He paused, repeated this question, and continued:
If you invest in the bank monthly, then you will be in a favourable position to receive
funding. If you are able to invest monthly, these records will be kept about you as a
further indication that you are a person who is able to refund, that you are reliable. So as
a result you can expect to receive a loan. As you yourself said, you came here to be
funded. But if we give you money without being refunded, who will lose out then? It will
be us: the bank! So we will give you funding based on your performance. At the moment
there is no money available to be lent. But soon it will be there. . . . The government is
here to help you, but it won’t help if there is no progress being witnessed.9
In discussion with me later, a board member framed the notion of individual
responsibility in terms of ‘commitment’ to the bank: ‘Members must start to save
in order for us to see how many are committed to the bank. We won’t give money
to those who aren’t committed.’
These comments hint at the existence of a rhetoric that characterized members
on the basis of personal qualities such as ‘reliability’ and ‘commitment’. The
social, structural and class differences that distinguished people’s access to
resources, and that crucially inﬂuenced their ability to invest in the bank, were
unacknowledged. This individualizing discourse is congruent with the ‘entrepre-
neur’ model that guides current approaches to microﬁnance in South Africa,
which is based on a similarly celebratory attitude towards individual talent and
ingenuity – seen as the driving force of the ‘informal’ economy – thus obscuring
the differing availability of resources that creates advantages or disadvantages for
particular people. A SAMAF newsletter of April 2010 (Vol. 6) celebrates the
‘success story’ of one beneﬁciary. With the ﬁnancial assistance of a SAMAF-
funded ﬁnancial intermediary, Mrs Mushope of Thohoyandou had transformed
her struggling efforts to make money from sewing Venda traditional clothes into a
thriving business employing four people. Subsequently, she was able to extend her
house and to send her children to tertiary education. Mrs Mushope represents the
model ‘entrepreneur’ –what SAMAF literature refers to as the ‘enterprising
poor’ – by earning a living from a single, successful business and investing in the
future security of her immediate family. Similar ‘success stories’ of individual
businesses are celebrated on SAMAF’s website, with terms such as ‘true
entrepreneur’ and ‘an example to the youth of South Africa’ accompanying the
isolated accounts of individual achievements.10
As the example of Sipho shows, however, while a minority of the bank’s
members did pursue a single business idea, others diverged signiﬁcantly from this
model, both because they made use of multiple sources of income, and because
they were involved in an extensive network of social relationships that inﬂuenced
ﬁnancial income and spending in a manner obfuscated by the nuclear household
model suggested in Mrs Mushope’s account.11 The meritocratic ideology
underpinning individual ‘success stories’ obscures the wider contexts that may
9This is an approximate translation from Zulu.
10<http://www.samaf.org.za/successstories.html>, accessed 19 September 2010.
11That many South Africans draw upon ‘multiple livelihoods’ is a point made extensively in the
literature. See, for example, Francis 2000; Murray 2000.
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enable or constrain the options available to individuals, regardless of their
personal qualities of perseverance, hard work and so on.
Evoking ideas of individual ‘innovation’ and ‘responsibility’, a crucial feature
of access to the bank’s loans is that they are conditional upon regular individual
savings in the bank. However, as suggested above, the bank has been introduced
into a socially and economically skewed setting: some are in a better position to be
able to invest in the bank than others, and hence more likely to access funds. Of
the thirteen members interviewed who had reinvested in the bank, ten were
farmers working within the Makhathini Irrigation Scheme. None were dry-land
farmers. The advantage experienced by farmers working within the scheme,
therefore, emerged in the patterns of investment into the bank, as the following
examples indicate.
Mr Nyawo has been renting a ten-hectare plot inside the Makhathini Irrigation
Scheme since the early 1990s. When we spoke in August 2010, he was farming
only six of these ten hectares because he lacked capital to plant the others. He also
needed to replant the sugarcane he was growing because the existing crop was old
and of poor quality. The revenue he received from selling his sugarcane to a
nearby factory was depleted by ongoing debt repayments. He complained,
therefore, that he was unable to be fully productive and to make progress. He had
recently invested R50 in the microﬁnance bank in addition to the initial R100
joining fee, and intended to continue investing each month. Indicating that many
had already lost hope because of delay, he explained his own motivations for
continuing his membership:
I hope to invest in the bank every month, because I want to see my involvement pay off,
to see whether it will provide. I won’t leave it half-way as others have done . . . because
this is our ﬁnal option for obtaining credit. Many people left, saying it wasn’t moving.
But I will stick with it, even though it has gone much slower than we expected.
Despite working inside the scheme and having the advantage of irrigated land,
therefore, Mr Nyawo was struggling to utilize all of the land that he was renting,
and was experiencing ﬁnancial difﬁculties due, in part, to existing long-term
debts. Nonetheless, the fact that his farming business was well-established and
received regular revenue meant that he was able to afford the monthly investment
of R50 into the bank. His long-standing career as a farmer and his previous
experiences of indebtedness spurred his hope in the bank, which he saw as the
‘ﬁnal option’ for gaining much needed credit. This was a subdued hope, a last
resort, given his and others’ disillusionment with a history of similar (failed)
projects and the personal indebtedness by which he already felt crippled.
A contrasting example, although with some overlap of shared experience, was
that of Mrs Dlamini, who began farming cotton on dry (non-irrigated) land in
Makhathini in 1994. Her cotton farming came to an end in about 2008, when the
nearby cotton ginnery that had previously processed much of the cotton in the
area closed down. Mrs Dlamini stopped farming because of the additional costs
of transporting cotton for processing elsewhere. Although describing herself as a
cotton farmer, she was currently earning most of her income from making and
selling traditional straw mats called amacansi. Her son, who had a temporary job
in Johannesburg, sometimes sent money, and she also borrowed small amounts
from mashonisas (local moneylenders) when necessary. Unlike the large majority
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of her neighbours, she had no access, either directly or via a family member, to a
government grant or pension, rendering her more vulnerable to the irregularities
of other income sources. Until about three years ago, she was receiving R500 per
month from the government for home-based care work. After these payments
ceased, she continued the work on a voluntary basis. She also volunteered for
the microﬁnance bank as a secretary and minute-taker prior to the employment
in July 2010 of a full-time administrator. For several months in 2010, cotton
farmers were in negotiation with the government to reopen the cotton ginnery in
Makhathini. If this goes ahead, she told me, she will resume farming.
She told me why she was drawn to the microﬁnance bank, explaining that it was
impossible to get a loan from normal banks if you did not have a job, because they
asked to see your pay slip: ‘Even if I tell them I am selling these amacansi they do
not believe me.’ She hoped to start investing in the microﬁnance bank from the
money she was making from selling amacansi, but when we spoke in September
2010, she had no money to spare. Ideally, she hoped to continue all these activities
so as to keep her income-generating options as varied as possible.
Mrs Dlamini’s account is typical. She does not aspire towards one career, but
attempts to minimize risk by engaging in a variety of strategies. This is important,
particularly in the absence of a stable and regular income source such as a
government grant. For her, as for Sipho, the microﬁnance bank represents merely
one of several possibilities. Thus ﬁnancial stability is not necessarily about having
a single successful business, but rather about reducing risk through diverse
pursuits: ‘Risk explains people’s concern to establish and maintain a rural base, to
disperse their households and to diversify their sources of livelihood’ (Francis
2000: 52).
The closure of the ginnery both highlighted and exacerbated the unequal access
to resources of farmers inside and outside the irrigation scheme. Due to the
increased transportation costs of processing cotton elsewhere, cotton production
had become more expensive. Despite these increased costs, however, many dry-
land farmers continued growing cotton because of its resilience to low rainfall in
contrast to other crop types. Others were forced out of farming altogether, as in
Mrs Dlamini’s case. In contrast, farmers working within the scheme unanimously
shifted to other types of crop production such as maize and sugarcane. Lack of
access to irrigated land, therefore, was a key factor inﬂuencing the degree of
vulnerability experienced by dry-land farmers and the choices available to them.
Mrs Dlamini’s account suggests that the success of future loans will depend
greatly upon a wider set of institutional arrangements, ecological conditions
and political interventions. It seems unlikely that, even with access to credit,
Mrs Dlamini could afford to continue farming cotton in the absence of a local
ginnery. For her, expectations about the microﬁnance bank were intertwined with
a wider set of institutional arrangements and the interactions of these with her
own livelihood strategies.
These two accounts challenge the ‘entrepreneur’ concept and its applicability to
popular economies. In certain respects, Mrs Dlamini is more innovative in terms
of the range of ﬁnancial strategies she employs, in contrast to farmers such as
Mr Nyawo. However, several important factors beyond her control place her in a
situation of greater ﬁnancial uncertainty. This means that she is less likely to be
able to access a microﬁnance loan in the future. While there are, in addition to its
pedagogical role, some clear reasons for making loans conditional upon regular
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saving, such as credit protection and encouraging members to scrutinize
management, it is a policy that is bound nonetheless to exclude the most
vulnerable members, or its young members such as Sipho. Explaining this in
terms of the ‘commitment’ or ‘reliability’ of individuals is problematic: in
Mrs Dlamini’s case, her long period of unpaid work for the bank negates any
suggestion that she lacks ‘commitment’. A characterization based on individual
qualities obscures the structural dimensions, namely the differing access to land
and other resources often produced by existing government and private
interventions, as in the case of the Makhathini Irrigation Scheme and the more
recent closure of the cotton ginnery.12
Let us return to the example of Mandla, the member who confronted the
SAMAF representative during the meeting. Mandla had been farming for a year
when I met him in April 2010. Managing to acquire land by collaborating with
several others, he took up farming because he was unable to ﬁnd any other job.
Mandla sold his produce locally at the roadside or by going from house to house.
He funded his farming by borrowing from amashonisa, who charged high rates of
interest (R40 a month for every R100 borrowed). As a result he had found it
difﬁcult to get any returns from farming yet: indeed, the enterprise – if it was
that –was only just surviving ﬁnancially, and he sometimes had to ask his
neighbours for seeds when unable to afford them. He supplemented his income by
collecting old iron and other pieces of metal and selling them to the scrapyard,
where he was paid for each piece according to its weight.
Mandla joined the microﬁnance bank because he wanted to receive a loan in
order to buy what he called ‘professional’ (presumably, genetically modiﬁed)
seeds that would prevent crops from rotting or being eaten by insects. He had
become disillusioned with the bank’s board members, accusing them of failing to
empathize with him. How could he pay R50 a month, he asked, when all of his
money had to go to his children or back into farming, or be returned to the
mashonisa? The lack of money-generating options available to Mandla enhanced
his suspicion of the bank and of those he believed to control it. Indeed, as in the
case of both Mrs Dlamini and Sipho, Mandla’s inability to invest in the bank will
prevent him from accessing its beneﬁts. He and other members began to question
whether the bank belonged to them or rather to the SAMAF representative who
had spoken to them at the meeting. ‘He’s only helping the bank, by borrowing
money from other banks and people, but he’s not helping the people who started
it,’ Mandla said. This comment suggests that his suspicion also arises from an
unclear sense of to whom the bank actually belongs. This is partly to do with the
paradoxical role of the government, described above, whereby regulation is
tightened while also being implemented indirectly, via ‘intermediary’ organiz-
ations such as the microﬁnance bank. The resulting elusiveness of government is
encapsulated by characters such as the SAMAF representative: he has a
functional and moral ambiguity similar to that of ‘brokers’ elsewhere (James
2011).
Mandla explained why he thought that the bank was nevertheless important
despite his complaints, and why he would continue to attend meetings. He told
12For more information on the history of Makhathini and the impact of changing institutional
dynamics there, see Witt et al. 2006.
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me that, several years ago, certain farmers in Makhathini had borrowed money
from Ithala Bank. But they ‘ate’ (wasted) all the money they received, and
subsequently failed to pay off their debt. This was the reason why farmers from
Makhathini now ﬁnd it difﬁcult to borrow from banks, he explained. Ithala
refuses to give a loan to anyone from Makhathini. He continued:
Now that we have our own bank the government will pay the money directly to us.
Because it is the government who is paying us, if there is someone who has borrowed
from [the bank] and won’t pay back, they will put that person in jail. This money is ours
to share. If someone fails to pay, they must go to jail. Ithala refuses to give us money
because of what those previous people did. Ithala learned their lesson from those people,
and don’t want the problem repeated. But with the government, that person will pay by
going to jail.
Here, Mandla refers to the entrenched history of indebtedness and of loan
defaulting in the area, which I outlined above. In describing this, he appropriates
a kind of individualizing rhetoric, claiming that irresponsible individuals are
to blame for the structural disadvantage now experienced by Makhathini’s
residents. His comments suggest that, for him, the direct and tangible physical
force carried out upon speciﬁc individuals by the state is seen as preferable to the
generalized exclusion resulting from free-market conditions.13 It is also possible
that Mandla’s comments refer, not to a collection of disparate individuals, but to
a category of farmers whom he perceives as better established and more privileged
than himself. Indeed, counter-intuitively, it is often only people who already have
a certain amount of security that can afford to become indebted (see James, this
volume), as was evident in the example of Mr Nyawo.
Mandla’s negative attitude about the bank is unrepresentative of its members in
general. Most were more hesitant in making any judgements of this kind and,
instead, expressed cautious hope and sometimes optimism. Yet it does raise an
interesting question about the extent to which expectations concerning the bank’s
success were related to individual economic vulnerability. Those who did share
Mandla’s strong suspicions about the credibility of board members were
invariably in a situation of ﬁnancial insecurity so severe that it was impossible
for them to invest savings into the bank. Mandla’s accusations about its
representative, its board members and the loan defaulters are intertwined with his
experiences of ﬁnancial insecurity; an instance of how ‘economic reasoning
intersects with moral reasoning’ in the struggle not only over access to money and
resources, but over the ‘dominant moralities’ that often underpin unequal
distribution (Pottier 1999: 24). As in the account of Sipho’s failed tender,
Mandla’s experience shows how encounters with formal institutions and
processes are mediated not only by people and events, but also by changing
expectations and judgements that often form during periods of delay, and that
13Mandla’s statement is paradoxical given that one of the government’s intentions in creating
‘ﬁnancial intermediaries’ such as microﬁnance institutions is precisely to ofﬂoad responsibility of
loan collection. As Porteous and Hazelhurst argue, ‘any state is usually ill-equipped to lend
directly to its citizens: it lacks the incentives to ensure consistent collection and enforcement of
credit contracts’ (2004: 189).
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may alter trust in the institutional process. In Sipho’s case, delay was evidence
itself of the breakdown of his role within a process that ultimately excluded him.
In addition to one’s own economic circumstances, another signiﬁcant factor
shaping expectations about the bank was that, while members were often proud of
having their own ‘bank’, as Sipho was when he ﬁrst told me about it, it lacked
many of the characteristics associated with commercial banks. Comparisons were
continually drawn, and often produced either mockery or unrealistic expectation.
One woman told me, for example, that she would only begin to invest in the
microﬁnance bank when it was located in Jozini like the other banks, and when
she was issued with a bank card with which to withdraw her money. Thus
perceived proximity of the bank to the formal sphere – physically, technologically
and aesthetically –was an important aspiration. But because it was unlikely that
such proximity would be achieved, its absence was in fact a threat to the stability
of the bank.
If it was perceived as lacking legitimacy, this rested on a view of the bank as
parochial in relation to the high-street commercial banks. Complaints prolifer-
ated about the ofﬁce being ‘in the bush’, away from the convenient location of
town. When asked whether they would begin to invest the R50 a month that had
been agreed upon in the April meeting, many said they would do so when the
bank became more established, better functioning, or more conveniently located
in town. Others mocked the lack of urbanity and sophistication displayed by the
bank. During a private conversation, one member had laughed at the SAMAF
representative’s suggestion of transferring money from other accounts to the
microﬁnance bank, amused at the thought of how she would cope when travelling
to Cape Town in the absence of a branch located in the city. While humorous,
comments such as this expressed the real feeling by members that the stability and
status of the bank as a feasible institution was under threat. During a meeting on
one occasion, Mr Siyaya – the Deputy Mayor of Jozini – encouraged the idea of
moving the bank to a location in Jozini, suggesting that the current ofﬁce was
inadequate. He jokingly added that he would not like to put his savings into that
ofﬁce, because the treasurer would ‘come along and steal them’. He pointed to the
treasurer as he said this, eliciting from him an annoyed chuckle, and from
members a stream of laughter. These joking comments nonetheless highlighted
the second source of threat to the bank: fears about the possibility of corruption.
This fear was explicit in the earlier comments by Mandla, and also formed an
undercurrent of suspicion among members generally. During meetings, board
members would address this issue often indirectly, in an attempt to diffuse
suspicion, or through humour. During an announcement, the treasurer jokingly
lamented the pestering that he received from bank members who, eager to ﬁnd
incriminating evidence against him, interrupted his trips to town by trying to
identify the brand status of his new pair of trousers or new bag. This unrelenting
badgering of which he claimed to be victim was testimony, his joke implied, to the
unreasonable and pedantic nature of corruption accusations.
Other jokes emphasized the perceived dependency of the bank upon the
government, by mocking the arbitrariness of the bureaucratic demands placed
upon them. The chairperson laughed as he suggested that, prior to shopping,
members should put their money into the bank and withdraw it immediately, in
order to generate inﬂow and outﬂow that was required for the bank to appear in
full operation. Again, this light-hearted comment underlined the ambiguous
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proximity of the bank to the state, and its inevitable acquiescence to government
bureaucratic demands. Yet it was also a genuine appeal based on the acknowl-
edgement that, should these demands fail to be met, the bank would disintegrate.
Thus, in order to diffuse such fears, those responsible for organizing and
managing the bank engaged continually in efforts to gain legitimacy for it, such as
calling a meeting in April 2010 to celebrate the formal receipt of the accreditation
certiﬁcate from SAMAF. In doing this, they were making a claim to ofﬁcial status
for the bank. The ritualized receiving of the certiﬁcate offered a concrete symbol
of successful formalization and acted as a kind of buffer against potential claims
to the contrary. Members would frequently comment on the certiﬁcate,
suggesting that the path was now free of obstacles, as though an end-point had
been reached.
Ultimately, then, criticisms centred on the bank’s lack of the sophisticated
signiﬁers of ‘formality’ displayed by commercial banks, as well as on corruption
allegations: both indicated the fear held by members of reverting to the messy,
uncertain and uncertiﬁed realm of the informal. These tensions had to do
with efforts at stabilizing the ‘domains of cognitive classiﬁcations’ that are vital
for an institution’s success (Mary Douglas, quoted in Guyer 2004: 127). They
demonstrate how the process of formalization entails the simultaneous
production of informal mediums, the two being mutually implicated in each
other, rather than the maintenance of two independent spheres (see Hart 2010).
Yet the degree of willingness on the part of members to invest money in the bank
relied on increasing conformity to a formal façade of the kind exempliﬁed by
commercial high-street banks.
CONCLUSION
When I returned six months later in March 2011, I discovered that the bank had
indeed moved to Jozini, where an initial small grant from SAMAF was being
used to rent an ofﬁce. Members were continuing to invest in the bank in greater
numbers. Even Sipho admitted that he too would invest in it if he had the money
to do so. The bank’s progress was marked by delay, however, and many had lost
hope altogether. During my three-month visit, no meeting had been held (one was
announced and then cancelled). Perhaps as a way of managing this delay, of
staving off the disgruntlement caused, board members had reopened the call for
membership, and were planning another ofﬁcial opening now that the bank was
newly located in town. A concern of which people were increasingly aware was
that, should the initiative ever get off the ground, the long membership list might
preclude the possibility of most people ever receiving a loan. The bank seemed
dangerously close to perpetuating, rather than alleviating, an existing and
pervasive mistrust in such initiatives.
On my return I also discovered that Sipho had abandoned his active search for
credit, at least for now, and had scaled down his aspirations, having exhausted
all avenues. He was using a room in his aunt’s house near Jozini to run a store
and was selling small items such as soft drinks, cigarettes, apples and sandwiches
with the help of other family members. Having spent time reading up on
business management in the library, he was keeping strict written records of all
transactions. Wedded to a narrative of business acumen, Sipho seemed to
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encapsulate – at least at the aspirational level – the quintessential ‘entrepreneur’
imaginatively forged in public discourse, an inﬂated version of the search for
‘formality’ in which other bank members were engaged. In practice, however,
Sipho’s scaling down represented something more like conformity with his
neighbours. He was making use of networks of kin, their assets and labour, along
with reliance on a trickle of pension money, to eke out a living. His efforts at
entering formal business had so far been unsuccessful. He, like everyone else, was
still waiting for credit.
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ABSTRACT
Drawing on ﬁeldwork in a rural area of KwaZulu-Natal, this article shows how
people experience government and other institutions in a patchwork of
encounters spread out over time, disjointedly, and via various intermediaries.
Aspirations change over time and in response to these encounters. Speciﬁcally, the
article focuses on the setting up of a government-regulated microﬁnance
institution. I consider the divergence between state-led models of ‘entrepreneur-
ship’ and the practice of individuals’ engagement with the organization and their
own expectations about it. One government stipulation was that the bank
demonstrated its effective operation through regular inﬂows and outﬂows of cash,
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prior to paying out any loans. As such, members were encouraged to invest
money in order to qualify for a loan at a later stage. I describe the factors that
enhanced or inhibited the willingness of members to invest in the bank, arguing
that these strategies were inﬂuenced not only by existing levels of economic
vulnerability experienced by individuals, but also by particular expectations of the
bank, including its perceived reliability, stability and degree of formality vis-à-vis
existing conceptions about banking. The example demonstrates that processes of
formalization are often partial and incomplete. Rather than examining them in
the narrow terms of success or failure, the article focuses on the intersection of
moral and economic actions that emerge in the prolonged states of limbo that
they create.
RÉSUMÉ
S’appuyant sur des travaux de recherche menés dans la région rurale du
KwaZulu-Natal, cet article montre comment les personnes vivent l’État et
d’autres institutions dans une multiplicité de rencontres étalées dans le temps, sans
cohérence, et au travers d’intermédiaires divers. Les aspirations évoluent avec le
temps et en réaction à ces rencontres. L’article traite en particulier de la création
d’une institution de microﬁnance sous le contrôle de l’État. L’auteur étudie la
divergence entre les modèles d’entreprise dirigés par l’État et la pratique des
particuliers de nouer le contact avec l’organisation, et les attentes qu’ils en ont.
L’État exigeait entre autres que la banque fasse la preuve de son bon
fonctionnement à travers des entrées et sorties d’argent régulières, avant
d’octroyer des prêts. À ce titre, les adhérents étaient encouragés à investir de
l’argent aﬁn de remplir les conditions requises pour l’octroi d’un prêt plus tard.
L’auteur décrit les facteurs qui ont renforcé ou diminué la propension des
adhérents à investir dans la banque, en soutenant que ces stratégies étaient
inﬂuencées non seulement par les niveaux de vulnérabilité économique éprouvés
alors par les personnes, mais également par les attentes particulières de la banque,
y compris sa perception de la ﬁabilité, de la stabilité et du degré de formalité vis-à-
vis des conceptions existantes sur l’activité bancaire. Cet exemple démontre que
les processus de formalisation sont souvent partiels et incomplets. Plutôt que de
les examiner en termes restreints de succès ou d’échec, l’article s’intéresse à
l’intersection des actions morales et économiques qui apparaissent dans les états
d’incertitude prolongés qu’ils créent.
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